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The Refinement of Seider v. Roth
The Refinement of Seider v. Roth: The Outlook
under the CPLR
In 1966, the New York Court of Appeals, in the landmark decision of Seider v.
Roth,1 for the first time allowed attachment of the obligations arising from an auto-
mobile liability policy.2 The plaintiffs, husband and wife, were injured in Vermont by
a Canadian driver. The Canadian was insured in Canada by a Connecticut insurer
doing business in New York. The plaintiffs, both New York residents, sued the
Canadian driver in New York for personal injuries sustained, gaining quasi in rem
jurisdiction by attaching as a debt his insurance company's obligation to defend
and contingently indemnify him. The court held that, since the insurance company
did business in New York, the debt existed in New York and was therefore subject
to attachment in that state.
3
Since New York courts have refused to apply certain foreign wrongful death
4 and
guest motorist statute5 damage limitations, Seider has been criticized as an. invitation
to forum shopping.6 New York's failure to recognize limited appearances
7 has also
prompted critics of the decision to label its result a denial of due process.
8 If the
1. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
2. The New York court in prior attachment cases had conceded that an insurance
company's obligation to defend and contingently indemnify was a debt under New York
law. See, e.g., Fishman v. Sanders, 18 App. Div. 2d 689, 235 N.Y.S.2d 861 (2d Dep't
1962), attachment vacated on other grounds, 15 N.Y.2d 298, 206 N.E.2d 326, 258 N.Y.S.
2d 380 (1965).
3. Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). The
court in Seider upheld the attachment under section 5201 and section 6202 of the
New York Civil Practice Law & Rules which provide in part:
§ 5201 (a). Debt against which a money judgment may be enforced. A money
judgment may be enforced against any debt, which is past due or which is yet
to become due, certainly or upon demand of the judgment debtor, whether it
was incurred within or without the state, to or from a resident or non-resident,
unless it is exempt from application to the satisfaction of the judgment. A
debt may consist of a cause of action which could be assigned or transferred
accruing within or without the state.
§ 6202 Any debt or property against which a money judgment may be
enforced as provided in section 5201 is subject to attachment. The proper
garnishee of any such property or debt is the person designated in section
5201 ....
4. See, e.g., Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211
N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961). In Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 539
(S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963),
the court refused to apply a Massachusetts wrongful death statute limiting recovery to
$15,000.
5. See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1963) where the court refused to apply the Ontario guest motorist statute in an
action involving a New York resident.
6. See, e.g., LaBrum, The Fruits of Babcock and Seider: Injustice, Uncertainty and
Forum Shopping, 54 A.B.A.J. 747 (1968).
7. See, e.g., Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. R. 320(c).
8. See, e.g., 43 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 58 (1968); 19 STAN. L. REv. 654 (1967).
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out-of-state defendant's insurance company appears on his behalf to defend, in
personam jurisdiction would be acquired over the insured.9 Should the defendant fail
to appear, the rendering of a default judgment on the attachment would leave the
insurance company with no opportunity to defend the action on its merits. As a
result the insurance company and its client could often be placed in mutually an-
tagonistic positions: the insured might not want the insurance company to appear
and defend on the merits lest a subsequent in personam judgment exceed the
maximum coverage of the policy; the insurance company, on the other hand, might
not wish to lose its economic interest in the litigation without an opportunity to
argue the merits of the case.
Seider was upheld in Simpson v. LoehmannIo (New York resident injured in Con-
necticut by a resident of that state) where the court recognized the due process
argument, 11 but denied its applicability on the grounds that the Seider court was not
attempting to enlarge the area of in personam jurisdiction, and that, even if the de-
fendant appeared, the judgment could not exceed the value of the attached res, i.e.,
the face value of the policy.1
2
In February, 1968, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York held, in Podolsky v. Devinney,t3 that Seider-type attachments of liability
insurance obligations were unconstitutional as violating due process. The defendant
in Podolsky had removed the case from the Supreme Court of Bronx County to the
federal district court on diversity, grounds.' 4 Since Seider-type actions by definition
involve diversity, defendants, in cases where the plaintiff alleges damages of $10,000
or more, may remove to a federal court.15 In deciding the case, Judge Croake noted
9. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. R. 320(c) provides: "When appearance confers personal jurisdic-
tion, in certain actions. In a case specified in section 314 where the court's jurisdiction
is not based upon personal service on the defendant, an appearance is not equivalent
to personal service of the summons upon the defendant if an objection to jurisdiction
under paragraphs eight or nine of subdivision (a) of rule 3211, or both, is asserted by
motion or in the answer as provided in rule 3211, unless the defendant proceeds with
the defense after asserting the objection to jurisdiction and the objection is not
ultimately sustained." (Emphasis added.)
For the effect of Rule 320(c) see H. WACHTELL, NEW YORK PRACTICE UNDER THE
CPLR 48-49 (1966): "It is obvious that the acquisition of in rem or quasi in rem
jurisdiction in many cases thus serves as a potent leverage device; unless the de-
fendant is willing to suffer a default judgment on the in rem or quasi in rem claim,
he has no alternative but to appear and confer jurisdiction for the in personam claim
as well." This effect was modified by Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234
N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967). Modification is continued in proposed changes
to Rule 320(c) which would provide that in all cases where jurisdiction is based solely
on a levy on defendant's property pursuant to an order of attachment, defendant's ap-
pearance would not be equivalent to personal service upon him. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT TO THE 1969 LEGISLATURE 51 (1969) [hereinafter
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT]. Pursuant to N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 229(3), unless
disapproved by the legislature, this proposed change will become effective on September
1, 1969.
10. 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967).
11. Id. at 310, 234 N.E.2d at 671, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 636.
12. Id. at 310, 234 N.E.2d at 671, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 636-37.
13. 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
14. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1964).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964).
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the seemingly clear language of the Civil Practice Law & Rules (CPLR) Rule 320(c),
under which, if an insured appeared to defend on the merits, he would subject himself
to full in personam jurisdiction and attendant personal liability for any judgment in
excess of the policy limits. He concluded that: "Here, the amount of the debt is not
fixed and may be greatly influenced by the defendants' choice of appearance or
nonappearance. It is this dilemma, operating to coerce the defendant into an other-
wise unattainable submission to personal jurisdiction, which amounts to a denial of
fair play and substantial justice . . . . On balance, then, the mere characterization of
an automobile liability insurance policy as a debt without more is not sufficient to
satisfy due process."
16
Two months after Podolsky, the New York Court of Appeals denied a motion for
reargument in the Simpson case. 17 In its per curiam opinion, the court dismissed the
above argument as failing to take account of its own earlier statement that the
Seider doctrine did not " 'expand the basis for in personam jurisdiction in view of
the fact that the recovery is necessarily limited to the value of the asset
attached . '.... "18 No judgment following a Seider levy, therefore, could exceed the
face value of the attached policy, even though the defendant appeared and proceeded
with the defense on the merits.
Armed with this unexpected construction of CPLR Section 3 20(c), the District
Court for the Southern District of New York entertained one more assault on
Seider v. Roth. Barker v. Smith 19 involved a defendant who, after removal to the
federal court, moved to vacate the attachment, relying on Podolsky. The court re-
considered the due process questions raised in Podolsky and distinguished the cases on
two grounds: since the plaintiff demonstrated that medical expense, pain and suffering,
compensible under the terms of the policy had been incurred after the plaintiff
returned to New York, a "legitimate basis" for attaching the policy existed; 20 and
since the Court of Appeals, in denying a rehearing in Simpson, had effectively re-
affirmed that any judgment must be limited to the face value of the policy, it re-
moved the principal ground relied upon by Judge Croake for finding such attach-
ments violative of due process.
21
In Minichiello v. Rosenberg,22 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit was also called upon to determine the validity of the Seider attachment
procedure. The court sustained its constitutionality by equating the attachment to a
judicially created direct action statute against the insurer, a concept which has been
upheld by the Supreme Court in Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp.23
The dissent in Minichiello would consider Watson inapplicable on its facts, since the
Louisiana direct action statute involved in that case applied only to accidents or
16. Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
17. Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968).
18. Id. at 990, 238 N.E.2d at 320, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 915-16.
19. 290 F. Supp. 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
20. Id. at 713.
21. Id. at 714.
22. No. 32534 (2d Cir., Dec. 12, 1968), ag'd on rehearing, (April 2, 1969).
23. 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
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injuries occurring in Louisiana. In the opinion of Judge Anderson, the constitutional
justification for a state's policy of protecting its own citizens injured by nonresidents
within its borders is sounder than that of a state's providing its citizens with a local
forum regardless of other local contacts: "It is one thing to require a resident of
Alaska to make trips to New York to respond to an action arising out of an accident
with a resident of New York in New York state to which the Alaskan had gone, and
quite another to make him do so for an accident which occurred in Alaska when the
New Yorker elected to go to Alaska and use its highways."
24
Despite the apparent willingness of both state and federal tribunals to uphold the
Seider attachment, the constitutional thrust of its opponents' arguments may still be
given at least limited effect. Judge Mansfield, discussing in Barker whether the Seider
procedure was an unduly harsh remedy, noted that: "inconvenience or hardship to the
parties or their witnesses resulting from their having to litigate here rather than in
Michigan or elsewhere may be alleviated by way of a motion for a change of venue
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404."25 Thus, while a motion for a change of venue is
discretionary, this court would apparently favor a motion for a change of venue
to the state where the tort occurred.
This device was also recognized by the Court of Appeals in reaffirming, en banc,
26
its decision in Minichiello. In that court's opinion, "[e]ither the district of the de-
fendant's residence or that of the accident, or both, [would] qualify for transfer."
27
In fact, such a motion for a change of venue (to the state where the accident oc-
curred), was granted by the District Court for the Southern District of New York a
week after Barker in Jarvik v. Magic Mountain Corp.
28
Seeking a change of forum by removing to federal court and then moving for
change of venue can become a complicated and time consuming process, and is only
available where the $10,000 jurisdictional requirement has been met. Proposed CPLR
Section 327,29 relating to the doctrine of forum non conveniens would provide de-
fendants with a much more direct route. This doctrine is not presently defined in
the CPLR30 or in any other New York statute. The interests and conveniences of all
the parties, the witnesses and the court are factors to be weighed by the court in the
exercise of the doctrine. One rule has emerged from the case law defining forum non
conveniens, this being that no matter what the circumstances may be, the doctrine is
inapplicable whenever the plaintiff is a New York resident.31 Such a policy obviously
lessens whatever utility the doctrine might have for out-of-state defendants faced with
litigating Seider attachments. Under the proposed CPLR Section 327, however, the
24. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, No. 32534 at 596 (Dec. 12, 1968), aff'd on rehearing,
(2d Cir., April 2, 1969) (Anderson, J. dissenting).
25. Barker v. Smith, 290 F. Supp. 709, 714 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
26. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, No. 32534 (April 2, 1969).
27. Id. at 1755.
28. 290 F. Supp. 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
29. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 62.
30. Motions to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens are generally now
made under N.Y. Cv. PRAC. R. 3211(a)2 (1963).
31. See Gregonis v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 235 N.Y. 152, 139
N.E. 223 (1923).
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domicile or residence in New York of any party would not preclude the court from
staying or dismissing the action when the court finds that "in the interest of sub-
stantial justice the action should be heard in another forum."
32
Assuming the availability of motions for change of venue under the federal rules,
and dismissals on the basis of inconvenient forum under the CPLR, what practical ad-
vantages or disadvantages remain for plaintiffs who institute Seider attachments?
Following the granting of a motion for change of venue in the federal system, in
addition to the possibility of litigating in an inconvenient or impractical forum, the
plaintiff may be burdened with the disabilty of having judgment limited to the face
value of the insurance policy. It is well settled that when a change of venue is
granted, the court in the new jurisdiction must apply the same law as would have
been applied had the case been heard in the jurisdiction where the case originated.
33
So, once the change of venue is granted, the plaintiff desiring to pursue his claim
finds that (1) he must appear in the jurisdiction wherein the tort occurred; (2) the
law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred is determinative of the issue of
negligence; 34 (3) New York law limiting the judgment to the face value of the
policy has transferred with the case. Had the plaintiff originally instituted the suit
in the new jurisdiction, points one and two above would still apply, but he normally
would not have a limit on the amount of the judgment he could obtain. If, however,
the jurisdiction wherein the tort occurred statutorily limits recovery to an amount
less than the face value of the policy, the plaintiff might still wish to avail himself
of a Seider-type attachment. For example, Massachusetts limits recovery in wrongful
death actions against certain common carriers to $50,000,35 but New York has no
such limitation. Since New York courts refuse to give effect to certain statutory
wrongful death limitations enacted by other jurisdictions36 a New York plaintiff
might be encouraged to bring a Seider-type action in a wrongful death case arising out
of an accident in Massachusetts where the policy exceeded $50,000. Even if a change
of venue was ordered, in applying New York law the court would have to allow
recovery up to the full amount of the attached policy.
The practical considerations of Seider attachments within the state court system
vary somewhat from those involved in federal situations. Where removal to federal
courts is available, these considerations, of course, are the same. Not so, however,
in those cases where federal jurisdiction is unavailable, either through lack of diversity,
or of the $10,000 jurisdictional amount. Under present law, the unavailability to de-
fendants in Seider cases of the doctrine of forum non conveniens assures New York
plaintiffs of an absolute right to sue in New York, regardless of circumstances making
suit elsewhere more convenient and equitable to all the other parties concerned.
32. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 66.
33. See, e.g., Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
34. See, e.g., Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956).
But see Maryland v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
35. MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 229, § 2 (Supp. 1969).
36. See, e.g., Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211
N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961); Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y.
1961), aff'd, 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963).
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Consequently, application of New York law is guaranteed, even where the plaintiff
assigns the case to a resident for precisely such a purpose.3 7 In these cases, where
federal jurisdiction is not available, Seider remains an invitation to forum shopping.
Fundamental fairness to out-of-state defendants, as well as practical realizations as
to the likely proliferation of cases coming before New York courts dictates a strong
need for the passage of proposed CPLR Section 327. Much is to be said for the
desirability, whenever possible, of equal treatment for litigants within the state and
federal court systems. The frequency of those cases coming before federal courts
sitting in New York which could far better be tried elsewhere will be diminished by
the likelihood of an order for a change of venue. A similar deterrent within the
state court system, in the form of broader application of forum non conveniens,
hopefully would also discourage institution in New York of those extreme cases
whose due process legality has up to now been so vigorously questioned.
37. See, e.g., Wagner v. Braunsberg, 5 App. Div. 2d 564, 173 N.Y.S.2d 525 (Ist Dep't
1958).
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